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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty states that any abuse of a dominant position is prohibited, and 
mentions four examples of abuses: (i) directly or indirectly imposing unfair prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; (ii) limiting production or development to the prejudice of 
consumers; (iii) unequal treatment of trading parties, thereby placing some at a competitive 
disadvantage; and (iv) making use of tying contracts, hence, forcing unnecessary 
supplementary obligations on customers. Of course, other price or non-price strategies may be 
considered an abuse as well; see Section 2.   
 
It is important to note that Article 82 EC does not forbid certain types of behaviour as such; 
only dominant firms are forbidden from using such strategies. In two of the earliest cases 
arising out of the article 82, United Brands
1
 and Hoffmann-La Roche,
2
 the ECJ (the European 
Court of Justice) gave a definition of dominance that still stands today: a dominant position is 
a position of economic strength that enables a firm to prevent effective competition on the 
relevant market; a firm with a dominant position has the power “to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of it consumers.” In 
economic terms, one would, hence, say that a dominant position is one in which the firm has a 
“reasonably large” degree of market power.  
 
In assessing whether or not a firm is dominant, the European Commission and the Court place 
great emphasis on the market share of the firm. Already in Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court 
held that very large market shares are in themselves, save in exceptional circumstances, 
evidence of dominance. While it is not possible to give an exact boundary, it is frequently 
stated that if the market share is above 50%, dominance is essentially presumed, while to date, 
there have been no cases where a firm with a market share of significantly less than 40% was 
found to be dominant. Of course, market shares are a very imperfect proxy for market power 
and, indeed, both the European Commission and the ECJ (the European Court of Justice) have 
frequently been criticized for attaching too much weight to market shares when assessing 
dominance, and for paying relatively little attention to other market characteristics, such as 
entry barriers. We will not deal with such issues here: we will deal with firms with large 
                                               
1
 Case 27/76, United Brands Co and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 
CMLR 429, para. 65. 
2
 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211. 
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market share, presume dominance and focus on the question whether certain types of 
behaviour constitute an abuse. 
 
Indeed, the text of Article 82 leaves this question open. A cursory reading might give the 
impression that the article deals primarily with straightforward monopolistic exploitation, 
hence, that the focus is on constraining monopolies. Such a narrow interpretation is also 
suggested by the French and German language versions of Article 82 that speak of “abusive 
exploitation”. Obviously, in this case, there would be a clear contrast with Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act in the US that only seems to aim at preventing “monopolization” of markets, 
hence, at anti-competitive (exclusionary) behaviour directed at competitors. This is not to say 
that the US is not concerned about exploitative behaviour, rather in the US that behaviour is 
usually countered by sector-specific regulation. As a large portion of the literature in 
experimental economics originates in the US, such a sharp contrast would be relevant for this 
article. One the one hand, one should not expect the “monopolization” experiments to deal 
with exploitative behaviour, but rather be more focused on exclusionary behaviour; on the 
other hand, the experimental literature on regulation would be relevant for this paper as well. 
Fortunately for us, in practice the difference is not that large. EC competition law focuses also 
mostly on exclusionary behaviour, as was evidenced recently again by the choice of the 
Commission to launch the discussion on the reform of Article 82 EC by a Discussion Paper 




Two aspects contribute to EU policy in this domain not being fundamentally different from 
policy in the US. First of all, in Continental Can,
4
 the ECJ made it clear for the first time that 
Article 82 does indeed apply also to anti-competitive conduct that weakens competition that is 
already weak. Since then this has been confirmed on various occasions. For example, in 
Hoffman-La Roche, the ECJ wrote that abuse relates to taking “recourse of methods different 
from these of normal competition” with the effect of hindering the competition still existing in 
the market or the growth of that competition. Secondly, in practice, the European competition 
authorities have been reluctant to intervene in cases of alleged exploitation; see below. 
Consequently, although historical factors may explain a difference between the two sides of 
                                               
3
 European Commission, DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses (19 December 2005). 
4





 in practice policy focuses on anti-competitive behaviour and so we will in this 
paper. We did not have to look, and did not look, into the literature on regulation. 
 
To summarize, under Article 82 EC, firms are not forbidden from having market power, 
however, firms with significant market power are banned from using certain business 
strategies that other, non-dominant, firms are free to use. Presumably, the idea is that welfare 
and consumer surplus can be hurt if dominant firms would be allowed to engage in such (anti-
competitive) practices. As will be clear, the challenge now is how to separate normal 
competitive behaviour from behaviour that should be classified as anti-competitive and, 
hence, be forbidden. On this issue, also see Vickers (2005). 
 
Experimental economics could contribute to answering this question and, hence, to 
competition policy in three ways. First, if dominant firms have the ability to set prices above 
the competitive level, to sell products of an inferior quality, or to reduce the rate of innovation 
below the level that would exist in a competitive market, experiments can be conducted to see 
whether dominant firms will indeed engage in such practices. Secondly, where theories are 
too weak to distinguish normal competitive behaviour from anti-competitive conduct, 
experiments might help out to see which theory is applicable, or which is the most relevant 
one. Thirdly, since, when making their decisions, antitrust officials rely on a variety of formal 
and informal arguments, experiments may be useful to see to what extent these arguments 
hold water: if a certain type of behaviour is termed abusive, is it indeed observed in the 
experimental laboratory and, if so, does it reduce welfare or consumer surplus?  
 
Conversely, antitrust cases may be a source of inspiration for experimental economics. Real 
life cases may demonstrate a variety of behaviours, which may or may not be profit 
maximizing, and one may investigate whether these behaviours are observed in the 
laboratory, and whether they can survive there. As we will see in this paper, there are plenty 
of allegedly abusive strategies that do not seem to have been formally investigated in the 
laboratory. The agenda of experimental economics seems to be influenced internally (by other 
experiments) and by developments of theory, but not so much by real life cases and problems, 
let alone by abuse cases. As we discuss more extensively in the concluding section, this is not 
                                               
5
 The main goal of policy in the US was to prevent dominant firms coming into existence, whereas European 
industrial policy accepted that large firms may be necessary to successfully compete on world markets, as long 
as they are constrained.  
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to say that experimental economics is irrelevant for practitioners of competition law: since 
experiments may help in delineating the boundaries where various competition theories are 
relevant, they can be extremely relevant. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we classify various types of 
abuses on the basis of the real life cases that have been dealt with by the European 
Commission and the ECJ. This allows addressing the second issue mentioned above: can 
antitrust cases serve as a source of inspiration for experimental economics? In Section 3 we 
review the experimental literature on anti-competitive behaviour, thereby addressing the first 
issue. We will see that few experiments are directly inspired by actual abuse cases; most of 
the experiments are motivated by theory or by other experiments, hence, the link with Section 
2 is not very intense. Nevertheless, some experiments contain important messages for antitrust 
practitioners. In Section 4 we put together the various bits and pieces and draw our 
conclusions. Specifically, we answer the following questions: (i) Is there scope for further 
experiments within the sphere of abuse of dominance? (ii) Is the gap between experimental 
research results supplied by the literature and the demand of case handlers due to the inherent 
boundaries of experimental research as such? (iii) What are the lessons from this paper for 





As is well known, Article 82 EC has given rise to far fewer cases than the other major 
provisions of EC competition law, such as Article 81 EC or the Merger Control Regulation. 
Annex I provides an overview (as of March 2005) of the relevant case law of the ECJ/CFI and 
the decision practice of the European Commission under Article 82 EC (please bear in mind 




That table indicates that, since the inception of the EC in 1958, there have been 50 relevant 
Commission decisions under this article, 26 of which were brought before the ECJ or CFI by 
way of judicial review (resulting in 9 annulments). In addition, there were 17 relevant ECJ 
                                               
6
 Since then, three new cases have been dealt with: (i) Astra Zeneca (which concerns a new type of abuse in the 
management of IP rights), (ii) the Coca-cola case (traditional type, with exclusivity, etc., not unlike Van den 
Bergh Foods) and (iii) the opening of proceedings in the recent Telefónica case, involving margin squeeze. 
 
 6
decisions in preliminary ruling procedures, answering questions put by national courts. In 
order to be complete, the table should also include the decisions of national courts and 
NCAs.7 This is however beyond the scope of the present research effort. 
 
In passing, we may note that, in the Netherlands, in 2003 alone, the Dutch competition 
authority (NMa) decided not less than 159 cases relating to the Dutch equivalent of Article 82 
EC. In only two of these cases (CR Delta (case 3353) and LOI (case 3125)), the NMa came to 
the conclusion that a dominant position might have been abused. The latter case concerns 
predatory pricing and, after a more thorough review, in 2005, the NMa concluded that its 
initial assessment had been mistaken: LOI did not have a dominant position. The former case 
is about non-linear pricing, and loyalty discounts in particular, and still has to be decided on 
appeal. Of the remaining 157 cases, in 79 the complaint was dismissed immediately, without 
any investigation; in the 78 other ones, that conclusion was reached after a brief investigation. 
We may conclude that there are frequent complaints about abuse, but that most often these 
apparently are not justified.   
 
In light of the table in Annex I, there are five broad groups of practices that have been dealt 
with by the Commission and the ECJ/CFI over the years:  
(i) pricing practices, including excessive prices, predatory pricing and price squeeze;  
(ii) rebates, actually a subset of pricing practices, but which has received so much 
attention that it is worth treating it separately. It includes loyalty rebates, non-
linear rebates and selective (‘fighting’) rebates;  
(iii) discrimination, comprising discrimination between customers (exploitative 
practice) and discrimination towards competitors in a vertical integration setting 
(which also has an exclusionary impact);  
(iv) various forms of refusal to deal, concerning either the supply of goods, of IP rights 
or information, of physical facilities (including the so-called “essential facilities” 
cases) or refusal to enter into standard cooperative (and pro-competitive) 
arrangements for the industry in question;  
(v) various types of non-price contractual practices, including tying and exclusivity 
deals. 
                                               
7
 Indeed, Article 82 EC is directly effective in its entirely and has been used by national courts over the past 
decades. As for NCAs, some of them were empowered to apply Article 82 EC before 2004, and they are now in 
any event with the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 on 1 May 2004. 
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This classification has been established on the basis of available classifications, but it is not 
entirely in line with the most recent classification made by the Commission in its Discussion 
Paper of 19 December 2005 (above). The Commission Paper is concerned only with 
exclusionary abuses, which it further splits between predatory pricing, “single branding” (a 
term used to cover all matters of rebates and exclusivity links), tying and bundling as well as 
refusal to supply. In the preparation of this paper, all types of abuse – exclusionary but also 
exploitative or discriminatory (as the Commission calls them) – were surveyed. On the basis 
of the table in Annex I, the information can be recombined to match the classification of the 
Discussion Paper. 
 
These groups of practices are discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.1. Pricing practices (excluding rebates) 
 
2.1.1  Excessive Pricing 
 
This is the complaint that price is too high. Such complaints have to be dealt with under 
European antitrust law, but, as described above, there is no equivalent in US law. In any 
event, European competition authorities have repeatedly stated that they did not want to 
become price regulators, and accordingly few cases of excessive pricing have been pursued. 




In addition to the natural reluctance of competition authorities to engage into pricing 
inquiries, figuring out when a price is excessive remains a fundamental problem. As the ECJ 
stated, a price is excessive if it bears no more “reasonable relation to the economic value of 
the product”.9 Whereas prices practiced by the dominant firm are easy to observe, the 
economic value of the product is usually not so readily ascertainable. The key empirical 
difficulty in applying competition law to pricing issues lies in determining that value. Note 
that in an experimental setting, the economic value can be precisely controlled; hence, 
experiments might be directly relevant here. 
 
                                               
8
 ECJ, Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
9
See ECJ, Judgment of 13 November 1975, Case 26/75, General Motors Continental v. Commission [1975] ECR 
1367 at Rec. 12, United Brands, supra, note 64 at Rec. 250 and Judgment of 11 November 1986, Case 226/84, 
British Leyland v. Commission [1986] ECR 3263 at Rec. 27. 
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The easiest way, in practice, of assessing the underlying economic value is to make a price-
price comparison, that is, to look at prices practiced by non-dominant competitors on the 
same market or at prices of similar products in other — as much as possible competitive — 
markets.10 These prices are usually as accessible as the prices of the dominant firm, and they 
can be thought to provide some indication of the economic value of the product in question. 




This price-price comparison approach raises an interesting question for experimental 
economics. Roughly speaking, standard economics predicts that the price that a firm charges 
depends on the firm’s cost structure, c, as well as on the market conditions, m, hence 
 
(2.1) ( )mcpp ,=  
 
The practical test for abusive pricing builds on p depending on m. One would like to know 
how strong this effect is according to experimental economics: is monopoly pricing 
substantially different from pricing in duopoly or oligopoly situations? It may be noted here 
that there are three experimental studies that analyse the pricing behaviour in oligopoly when 
the number of firms in the market varies: two early studies by Fouraker and Siegel (1963) as 
well as by Dolbear et al (1968), and a more recent study by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). 
Unfortunately, none of these studies includes a monopoly so that they leave open the question 
whether or not monopoly pricing is substantially different from pricing in an oligopoly. In 
Section 3.1, we will return to this issue and refer to other experiments that illustrate that the 
extent to which monopoly power can be exercised depends on the institutional structure of the 
market and that the resulting price may well be lower than the one predicted by theory.  
 
This comparative approach will be unavailable in a number of cases for lack of comparative 
data, that is, where the dominant firm enjoys a monopoly or no comparable competitive 
markets exist. In such cases, United Brands makes an inquiry into production costs, hence, a 
price-cost comparison, almost unavoidable. In its decision, the Commission had found, 
among others, that United Brands violated Article 82 EC (ex 86) by charging excessive prices 
for its bananas on the following grounds: there was a wide difference (up to 100%) in the 
prices charged by United Brands for Chiquita bananas on the Irish market — which were 
                                               
10
See M. Martinez, “Some Views on Pricing and EC Competition Policy”, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/index_en.htm  at 7. 
11
ECJ, Judgment of 4 May 1988, Case 30/87, Bodson v. Pompes funèbres des régions libérées [1988] ECR 2479. 
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thought to cover costs — and elsewhere in the EC, and it recommended that United Brands 
reduce its prices.
12
 This represents an interesting approach, but its value is limited since it 
involves a comparison of prices charged by a dominant firm in different geographical 
markets.13 The ECJ annulled that part of the Commission decision, on the ground that the 
approach was flawed; the Commission could not simply rely on price comparisons without at 




In economic terms, in a price-cost comparison, one investigates what the costs, c, are in 









Once having calculated this index of market power, a judgment call has to be made: how high 
is L allowed to be, and what to make of fixed costs? This is not so easy, one gets into all kinds 
of accounting issues. It does not seem so obvious what the contribution of experimental 
economics could be in this domain. Of course, in the laboratory, one can investigate directly 
to what extent subject are engaging in monopolistic pricing, and what the constraints on such 
pricing might be; see Section 3.1 on monopoly pricing. 
 
A third test for abusive pricing has been used by the Dutch competition authority and is 
inspired by the way regulators proceed. It involves an investigation of the rate of return. 
Consequently, this test does not look at prices, but at profits, or, more specifically, to returns 
on investment. One compares the ROCE (Return On Capital Employed) to the WACC (the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital), the return that investors in the company would be 
satisfied with, as it provides an adequate return for the risk that is taken. The idea is that if the 
ROCE is much higher than the WACC, the price must be too high. As said, this method of 
rate of return regulation originates in regulated industries. We are not aware of a laboratory 
investigation of such a regulation. 
                                               
12
Decision 76/353 of 17 December 1975, Chiquita [1976] OJ L 95/1 at 15-6. The Commission recommended 
that United Brands reduce its prices in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark to a level 
at least 15% below its then current prices for Germany and Denmark. 
13
In the Decision, ibid., the Commission also mentioned that United Brands’ prices were superior to those of its 
non-dominant rivals, which were still profitable. In United Brands, supra, note 64 at Rec. 266, however, the ECJ 
held that the difference to which the Commission referred to was not remarkable enough (some 7%) to support a 
finding of abuse. 
14




2.1.2 Predatory Pricing 
 
Predatory pricing is the practice in which the dominant firm charges prices that are so low as 
to drive competitors from the market, thereby aiming to obtain supranormal profits 
afterwards. There are conflicting theories about whether, or in which circumstances, the 
practice can be a rational business strategy; see Bolton et al. (2000) for an overview. As a 
result, predatory pricing has also attracted attention from experimentalists, who have tested 
the predictions of the various theories and have pitted these against each other; see Section 
3.6. 
 
Despite the theoretical interest in the phenomenon, predatory pricing seems to be rare in 
practice. The case law with respect to predatory pricing in Europe is limited (four cases), but 
it has attracted remarkable attention, the Akzo and Tetra Pak II cases having become leading 
precedents under Article 82 EC. The last two cases, DP AG (Parcels) and Wanadoo 
Interactive, date from 2001 and 2003 respectively and are likely also to have an impact, since 
they pick up on suggestions made in the Notice on Access Agreements in 1998 and update the 
law in the context of multi-service industries (including network industries). Until then, the 
law was reasonably clear and had remained unchanged since Akzo. According to the case law, 
a price is predatory if it is below marginal cost (AVC), or if it is below average cost (ATC) 
and is part of an explicit plan to eliminate a competitor. Note that the latter respect implies 
that predation cannot be inferred from market and cost data alone: one needs to know the 
intentions of the firm. For experimental economics, this has the consequence that the strategy 
method should be employed to test the practice. 
 
In Wanadoo Interactive, the Commission conducted a very detailed analysis of the costs of 
Wanadoo Interactive. It applied the abuse test set out above, yet even where the Commission 
found that Wanadoo did not recover AVC, it still inquired into intent. Indeed a key factor in 
the decision was the evidence that Wanadoo intended to drive its competitors out of the 
market. Such evidence was found in explicit statements contained in company documents
15
 
and in an objective analysis of Wanadoo’s strategy.16 Furthermore, none of the justifications 
                                               
15
 Ibid. at Rec. 110-141. 
16
 Ibid. at Rec. 274-299. As we ourselves note, indeed predation is more complex than just a price test. 
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put forward by Wanadoo for its strategy was accepted by the Commission.
17
 A number of 
pronouncements are interesting, where the Commission adopted a broader perspective on 
predation than what is sometimes found in economic theory. For instance, the Commission 
held that behaviour less radical than the exclusion of competitors, i.e. mere inhibition, could 
also constitute predation under competition law.
18
 Similarly, according to the Commission, it 
was not necessary to prove that Wanadoo would, or could, recoup its losses,
19
 although it did 
show that the relevant market was characterized by entry barriers, which do make recoupment 
possible.
20
 In the US, the possibility of recoupment is an integral part of the test for predation. 
 
The economic literature has focused on the question whether the cost test as described above 
is suited to separate prices that are “really” predatory (i.e. profitable only because of induced 
changes in the behaviour of competitors or of the market structure) from prices that are 
normally competitive. The literature argues that the test is misspecified: under a variety of 
conditions, a firm will wish to charge prices that are below cost. Secondly, there is an 
extensive literature dealing with the question under which circumstances predatory pricing 
can be a rational business strategy. For more details, we refer the reader to Bolton et al. 
(2000). The main lesson coming out of that literature is that market structure may be more 
important than cost data, hence, that the test for predation should focus on, or at least also 
include this aspect; in particular, recoupment of the initial losses will be possible only if there 
are entry or re-entry barriers. Consequently, only in these cases can predation be profit 
maximizing. 
 
In contrast to the Chicago view that predation will always be irrational, hence, that the 
practice should not be of concern to antitrust agencies, the more recent economics literature 
has identified a certain number of situations (models) in which predation could indeed be 
rational. The experimental economics literature could make contributions to answering two 
questions:  
(i) Does predation happen in the cases in which theory predicts it could happen?  
(ii) Does predation happen in other situations? 
We will return to these questions in Section 3.6. We will see that the answers are ambiguous: 
predatory pricing can be observed in the laboratory, but not always in those cases where it is 
                                               
17
 Ibid. at Rec. 305-331. 
18
 Commission decision of 16 July 2003, Wanadoo Interactive, available on the website of DG COMP, Rec. 266. 
19
 Ibid. at Rec. 333-335. 
20
 Ibid. at Rec. 336-367.  
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predicted by theory. One should, however, be careful with interpreting the experimental 
results: economists do not always adopt the same definition of predation as the one that is 
used in EU case law. 
 
2.1.3. Price squeeze 
 
Price squeeze, also called margin squeeze, refers to the situation where an entrant has to buy 
an input from the dominant firm in order to compete with it on the output market. If the 
dominant firm sells to the competitor at a price that is higher than the price it charges 
consumers for the final product, clearly even an efficient competitor faces a very difficult 
situation. The Commission defines price squeeze as “an insufficient spread between a 
vertically integrated dominant operator's wholesale and retail charges… especially where 
other providers are excluded from competition on the downstream market even if they are at 




There are only two relevant cases of price squeeze, namely Napier Brown and Deutsche 
Telekom.  The latter case illustrates very well the current state of the law. The Commission 
decided that DT’s wholesale and retail charges for access to the local loop amounted to a 
margin squeeze. That is, the spread between DT’s wholesale tariffs for unbundled access to its 
subscriber lines and the weighted average of its corresponding retail services tariffs (analogue, 
ISDN and ADSL connections) left DT’s competitors an insufficient margin to compete for 
retail subscribers, as the spread was lower than DT’s own downstream product-specific costs. 
 
2.2. Rebate practices 
 
The practice of the Commission and the case-law of the ECJ/CFI contain a remarkably high 
number of cases concerning rebate practices. EC law remains relatively strict on this issue to 
this day, allowing dominant firms very little margin to offer rebates to their customers, except 
for linear rebates which are directly linked with cost savings on the volume of the order. 
Recent decisions of the CFI in British Airways
22
 and Michelin II
23
 have only confirmed the 
state of EC law on the matter, despite the criticism levelled at earlier cases. 
 
                                               
21
 Ibid. at Rec. 108. 
22
 CFI, Case T-219/99, British Airways v. Commission, not yet reported. 
23
 CFI, Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Commission [2003] ECR II-4071. 
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2.2.1 Non-linear pricing (Quantity Discounts) 
 
At stake in Michelin II, among others, is the question whether quantity discounts can be anti-
competitive. A similar issue arose in the Dutch case CR Delta, already referred to above, and 
as that case is simpler, we use it here as an illustration.  
 
CR Delta (www.cr-delta.nl) is a farmer cooperative trading in bull seamen. In CR Delta, the 
NMa objected to a very simple discount scheme: if a farmer’s annual expenses exceed certain 
thresholds, he gets a certain discount (ranging from 1% to 5%) over the entire volume. In 
general such discount schemes are allowed if they can be justified on the basis of cost savings. 
The NMa, however, was not convinced of this and argued that, in fact, the discount scheme 
functioned as a loyalty scheme. In particular, it considered the period (1 year) and the 
cumulative nature (the fact that discount is given over the entire volume) to be anti-
competitive. In its decision, the NMa did not refer to an economic model to substantiate this 
claim, however, and interesting for this paper, it refers to a behavioural aspect: farmers that 
are close to a threshold would be induced to stay with the dominant company in order to reach 
the next level. It would seem interesting to test whether this effect is real, or more generally, 
to investigate under what circumstances quantity discounts induce loyalty.  
 
2.2.2. Loyalty rebates 
 
Loyalty rebates increase the costs of switching to a competitor and a dominant firm is in 
principle forbidden from using such rebates. CR Delta also involved a loyalty rebate: a farmer 
that bought of least 90% of its supplies from CR Delta received a discount of 1%, a farmer 
that bought only from CR Delta got a discount of 2%. Interestingly, the scheme was never 
implemented, but it was announced and NMa argued that the announcement as such was anti-
competitive. In this respect there is a relation with announcement effects and vapourware; we 
are not aware of experiments related to this practice. More generally, loyalty schemes play, at 
least in part, on certain consumer characteristics, hence, they might be a fertile ground for 




Interestingly, CR Delta was also offering a third type of rebate scheme, which was claimed to 
induce foreclosure. The company is offering two types of products: tested seamen of known 
quality and seamen of bulls that has not yet been used for breeding, or very little, and that still 
needs to prove itself. CR Delta needs the cooperation of farmers to test seamen of the latter 
type and, if successful, to possibly transform it into a profitable product on the tested market. 
To induce farmers to engage in such testing, it gave a reduction of 10% on tested seamen to 
those farmers that were willing to do a certain amount of testing. The price reduction was 
viewed as a reward for participation in the testing program, but the NMa argued that it 
induced “testers” to buy from CR Delta, hence, that it foreclosed the market for competitors. 
Obviously, if the reward for testing had been lump sum, farmers would indeed be more 
inclined to buy from competitors. Again we do not know of papers in the experimental 
economics literature dealing with this or similar pricing strategies. 
 
2.2.3. Selective rebates (‘fighting’ practices) 
 
There are two cases of ‘fighting’ practices, where the dominant firm systematically set out to 
underbid its competitors, namely Irish Sugar24 and the Cewal25 case. In the former case, the 
dominant Irish sugar producer and packer granted selective rebates to customers who were 
importing sugar from other Member States and offered rebates to customers of competing 
packers on condition that they source all of their needs from it. In the latter case, the various 
liner conferences reacted to the entry of new competitors on the Europe-West Africa cargo 
lines by departing from its tariff to offer cargo services at the same rate as the competitors at 




In the previous Section, we already discussed second-degree price discrimination. In this 
Section, we focus on first-degree price discrimination (charging different prices to different 
costumers) and third-degree price discrimination, which is charging different prices in 
different markets. EC competition law deals with three broad types of discrimination:  
(i) First-degree price discrimination: Discrimination among the customers of a 
dominant firm (see the classical cases United Brands or Michelin I).  These are 
                                               
24
 Decision of 14 May 1997, Irish Sugar [1997] OJ L 258/1. 
25
 Decision of 23 December 1992, Cewal, Cowal, Ukwal [1993] OJ L 34/20, upheld on this point by the CFI and 
the ECJ. 
 15
cases where price discrimination is used to extract the most profit from individual 
customers who are in the eyes of the competition authority in a similar position 
and should thus pay similar prices.  
(ii) Third-degree price discrimination: A sub-set of the former type, which is more 
likely to fall foul of EC competition law, is discrimination among customers 
according to the Member State where they are located. This type of practice, even 
if it may be linked to differing preferences amongst national markets in various 
Member States, runs against the market integration objectives of the EC Treaty. A 
pre-eminent example of this is found in the Tetra Pak II case.  
(iii) Another sub-set of first-degree price discrimination has appeared in recent times:  
here a vertically-integrated firm with a dominant position on, say, the upstream 
market, would discriminate in favour of its own downstream subsidiary and 
against the competitors of that subsidiary. The objective there is no longer just 
exploitation, but also exclusion. See here HOV SVZ/MCN for an example, where 
the German railway operator Deutsche Bahn applied different prices for the 
transport of containers from seaports to German destinations, favouring German 
ports (Hamburg, Bremen), which it served on its own, over Benelux ports 
(Antwerp, Rotterdam), which were served via a joint venture with other railway 
operators.26 
 
The economics of (monopolistic) price discrimination is well understood: if it leads to 
expanding the size of the market, it is most likely to be welfare improving; otherwise most 
likely it is not. Article 82 EC forbids any price discrimination by dominant firms; hence, the 
law might be more strict than is desirable from the point of view of economic welfare. EC 
competition law is, however, not only guided by that objective, but also by the –sometimes-
prevailing – objective of market integration. For a discussion on price discrimination in the 
experimental economics literature, see Section 3.2  
 
2.4 Refusal to deal 
 
Cases where a dominant firm refuses to supply an existing customer, or a potential 
competitor, probably offer the largest contrast between EU and US policy. Ordering the 
dominant firm to supply is a strong interference with business freedom and in this domain 
                                               
26
 Decision of 29 March 1994, HOV SVZ/MCN [1994] OJ L 104/34, upheld by the CFI. 
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European policy has typically been much more interventionist. The figures in Annex I 
indicate that refusal to deal is the largest group of practices dealt with under Article 82. 
 
Refusal to deal cases can be split in a few sub-categories:  
(i) there are the “classic” cases where a dominant firm ceases to supply its 
competitors (Hugin, Hilti) or its established distribution channels (United Brands, 
Commercial Solvents); 
(ii) refusal to grant access to production facilities, including the so-called “essential 
facilities” cases. These were popular in the 1990s and include precedents such as 
Bronner, London European/Sabena and Sea Containers / Stena;  
(iii) refusal to grant access to IP rights and other valuable information. These include 
cases such as Magill, IMS Health and the recent Commission decision in 
Microsoft; 
(iv) refusal to cooperate in normal industry practices, such as interlining (British 
Midland). 
 
It is in this domain that the special responsibility towards competition that a dominant firm in 
Europe is said to have is playing an important role. In Commercial Solvents, for example, a 
pharmaceutical firm cancelled orders for a certain raw material, presumably expecting to be 
able to buy that material cheaper elsewhere. When the alternative supplies did not prove 
satisfactory, the firm turned to the original supplier, a dominant firm, again, but that supplier 
had meanwhile decided to vertically expand into the downstream product market, hence, it no 
longer wanted to supply. The ECJ ruled that thereby the dominant producer abused its 
dominant position as its strategy could eliminate all competition from the market. Hugin is 
essentially similar: a manufacturer no longer wanted to supply spare parts to a retailer is it 
wanted to build up its own spare parts business. In United Brands, UBC wanted to punish a 
distributor for the fact that it had participated in a promotional campaign of a competitor of 
UBC. According to the ECJ, the counter-measure of no longer supplying this distributor was 
not proportional and, hence, abusive. It is remarkable that, in all these older cases, there is 
little attention to efficiency arguments: the dominant firm is simply said to have a 
responsibility to keep competition alive. 
 
Essential facility cases are special cases of refusal to deal: a competitor needs access to the 
upstream production facilities of the dominant firm in order to be able to profitably compete 
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on the downstream market. The question now is under what conditions, and against which 
terms, the dominant firm should be forced to share its facilities. The so-called “essential 
facilities doctrine” that aims to answer this question originates in the US, and has been 
extensively criticized there; see the seminal article by Areeda (1990) 27 and the recent ruling 
of the Supreme Court in Trinko v. Verizon Communications.
28
 Three important recent EU 




 broadcasters were not willing to hand over their programming data to a publisher 
who wanted to publish a complete programming guide (as opposed to the single-broadcaster 
guides which the broadcasters themselves issued). The ECJ argued that the refusal to supply 
prevented a new product, for which there was apparent demand, from coming on the market, 
hence, that the refusal to supply constituted an abuse according to Article 82(b). This decision 
has been criticized for being too interventionist and for eliminating firms’ incentives to invest. 
In the later cases, Bronner and IMS Health, the ECJ took a more reserved stance and sided 
more with the holder of the facility to which access was claimed.  
 
In Bronner30 the ECJ shows its awareness of the investment issue and it refuses to grant a 
competitor access to the facilities of a dominant firm. Bronner deals with a small newspaper 
company, with low circulation, that wants to get access to the nationwide distribution system 
of a larger competition. Bronner argues that its circulation is too small for it to have its own 
viable system, hence, that it should get access to the unique nationwide distribution system, 
that of its competitor. The ECJ, in essence argues that, given the current market shares, the 
claim might be true, but that this fact does not justify getting access. If Bronner would have an 
equal market share as the leading firm, then a nationwide distribution system would be viable 
for Bronner itself; hence, the competitor should not be forced to share. It has been argued in 
Bergman (2000)31 that this Bronner-test constitutes a formidable hurdle for new entrants: it 
may simply not be feasible to reach a comparable market share within a reasonable time 
frame. 
 
                                               
27
 P. Areeda, Essential facilities: an epithet in need of limiting principles, (199) 58 Antitrust Law Journal 841. 
28
 Docket No. 00-682 (13 January 2004). 
29
 Case C-241, 241/91P RTE & ITP v. Commission, [1995] ECR I-743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718. 
30
 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791 4 CMRL, 112 
31
 M. Bergman, The Bronner case – A turning point for the essential facilities doctrine? [2000] ECLR 59. 
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The latest instalment in this line of case-law was IMS Health, issued by the ECJ in 2004.
32
 In 
that case, a firm called NDC was trying to invoke EC competition law to obtain an order 
forcing IMS Health to license its “brick structure”, i.e. the geographical breakdown in the 
reporting format used in the IMS report on the sales of pharmaceutical products. This 
structure was protected by copyright, and IMS refused to license it, preventing NDC from 
entering the market to compete with the dominant provider IMS. The ECJ restated the 
Bronner test, namely that 
 
“in order for the refusal by an undertaking which owns a copyright to give access to a product or 
service indispensable for carrying on a particular business to be treated as abusive, it is sufficient 
that three cumulative conditions be satisfied, namely, that that refusal is preventing the emergence 
of a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand, that it is unjustified and such as 




The ECJ also elaborated on the “new product” condition, stating that the competitor seeking 
access to the intellectual property must not “intend to… essentially duplicat[e] the goods or 
services already offered… but intend… to produce new goods or services not offered by the 
owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand.” After IMS, it seems 
unlikely that competition law will be often used to force access to the facilities of dominant 
firms.  
 
Note that IMS is simply an example illustrating the general conflict between Intellectual 
Property Law and Competition Law and the trade-off between investment and diffusion of 
new ideas and technologies. It seems that this conflict area might be a fruitfull one to study 
for experimental economists.  
At this point we are not aware of experimental work studying refusal to deal. 
 
2.5 Non-price contractual practices 
 
A number of non-price contractual practices have been found abusive over the years. Here as 
well, the Tetra Pak II case provides an illustration of a large number of such practices. The 
main ones are:  
(i) tying and bundling, dealt with in greater detail below;  
                                               
32
 ECJ, Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECR I-5039. 
33
 At para. 38. 
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(ii) exclusive deals, in particular agreements whereby the dominant firm becomes the 
exclusive supplier of the other contracting party (Soda Ash);  
(iii) display exclusivity, especially in the well-known Van den Bergh Foods case 
involving ice-cream freezers. 
 
In the 1970s, there were a number of cases where it was alleged that the enforcement of IP 
rights (essentially to prevent parallel trade) constituted an abuse of dominant position 
(Deutsche Gramophon, Parke Davis). However, the ECJ always stood by its position that the 
mere exercise of IP rights did not constitute an abuse in the absence of concrete evidence of 
anti-competitive effect. 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Article 82 specifically lists tying as a possible abuse. There 
is a rather large recent economics literature dealing with the question of whether, and in 
which circumstances, tying might be bad for welfare. Three leading cases in this domain are 
Hilti, Tetra Pak II, and Microsoft. Quite surprisingly, despite the considerable interest by 
economic theorists in issues related to tying and bundling, we are not aware of experimental 
work that deals with this topic. 
 
 
3. EXPERIMENTS ON ABUSING MARKET POWER 
 
We are not the first attempting to review the experimental literature that contributes to 
industrial organization with emphasis on antitrust issues. There are at least two other articles 
that should be mentioned here. The most comprehensive overview to date is Wellford (2002). 
Many of the experimental studies she reviews, however, are not directly related to the 
narrower focus of our overview. Nevertheless, there are some general conclusions that are 
interesting to be reiterated here (see p.41 in Wellford’s article): First, institutional form 
matters more than theory implies. For example, under certain institutional settings the 
competitive outcome is more robust than theory would predict it to be. Second often market 
power is not exercised to the full extent. Even single seller markets do not necessarily lead to 
monopoly outcomes and, although sellers with market power may set prices at 
supracompetitive levels, they do not always restrict production to the level predicted by 
theory.  Third, Wellford points out that most laboratory studies to date have omitted two 
features that are crucial to antitrust issues, namely possible entry and the existence of antitrust 
 20
agencies. Thus, it is likely that results are biased towards more collusive outcomes, or 
outcomes that violate antitrust laws. In the light of these two omissions, it is especially 
worthwhile mentioning that many market environments that Wellford reviewed are quite 
competitive. 
 
Another, more personal, review is Davis and Wilson (2002), who propagate the incorporation 
of experimental work into the development of antitrust policy. We agree with their assessment 
that appropriately designed experiments can uniquely provide important insights relevant for 
competition policy. They illustrate this point by reviewing some of their experimental work 
on detecting price fixing in sealed bid auctions, enforcement standards for merger-specific 
efficiencies and differentiated product competition and the antitrust litigation model. Our 
paper focuses on the abuse of market power by dominant firms and is complementary to 
theirs. 
 
In order to economize on space, when we review the experimental literature on abusive 
practices, we will usually not provide details on the underlying economic theories; for this we 
refer to, for example, Motta (2004).  
 
3.1 Monopoly pricing 
 
Monopoly pricing has been tested in the lab using a variety of trading institutions; most 
prominently posted-offer markets
34





 Smith (1981) tests these three institutions and finds that monopolists in 
                                               
34 See Smith (1981), Isaac et al. (1984), Coursey et al. (1984), Harrison and McKee (1985), and Harrison et al. 
(1989). 
35
 See Smith (1981) and Smith and Williams (1989). 
36
 See Smith (1981). 
37 Let us very briefly explain these institutions (for more details see e.g. Davis and Holt 1993). Each of these 
markets are divided into a series of trading periods. Subjects are assigned the role of a seller or a buyer. At the 
beginning of a period buyers are assigned unit valuations and sellers unit costs. Buyers’ profits are given by the 
difference between the unit value and the contract price whereas sellers’ profits are given by the difference 
between the contract price and the unit cost. In a double oral auction buyers call out bids at which they are ready 
to buy a unit whereas sellers call out offers at which they are ready to sell a unit. A buyer can accept any 
standing offer and a seller can accept any standing bid at any time. A posted-offer market follows a two-step 
procedure. First, sellers privately select a price for the current trading period and indicate the maximum number 
of units they are willing to sell at this price. Then these prices (but not the maximum number of units) are made 
public to the buyers and the other sellers. Then buyers are randomly and sequentially given the opportunity to 
make as many purchases as they like at any seller who has not yet sold his maximum number of units. When one 
buyer stops shopping another buyer is called to do his purchases.This continues until each buyer got the 
opportunity to make purchases or until all units on offer are purchased. A posted-bid market works like a posted-
offer market with the roles reversed. That is, in a posted-bid market it is the buyers who post bids at which they 
are willing to buy units from sellers. 
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double-oral and posted-bid markets are not able to exercise market power to the extent 
predicted by theory. In contrast to this, in the one posted-offer market reported in Smith 
(1981), the monopolist performs as predicted. To illustrate these results, Holt (1995) 
computes the  “monopoly effectiveness index”  
 
(3.1) M = (πa – πc)/( πm – πc)  
π
a : actual profit, πc : profit at the competitive equilibrium and πm : monopoly profit 
 
for the final period in the markets reported in Smith (1981).
38
 The results are as follows: 
double auction monopoly: M = 0.36; posted-bid monopoly: M = 0.15; posted-offer monopoly: 
M = 1.0. Plott (1989) remarks that the likely reason for the failure of the monopolist in the 
double auction to exercise market power is the fact that buyers in this institution do not 
behave passively as price takers but engage in withholding purchases. This behaviour causes 
the monopolist to price more cautiously. 
 
Holt (1995) also computes the monopoly effectiveness index M for other posted-offer 
monopoly experiments. These experiments vary the cost structure (decreasing or increasing), 
the type of buyers (human or simulated) and the level of experience of subjects. Holt finds 
that the index varies considerably. It is highest in the study by Harrison, McKee and Rutstrom 
(1989) with experienced subjects, simulated buyers and a decreasing cost function where M = 
0.78 and it is lowest in another treatment of the same study where all features of the design 
are the same except that subjects are inexperienced. For the latter treatment Holt computes M  
= 0.44.  
 
In a more recent contribution Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2004) analyse the effects of buyer 
concentration on the pricing of a monopolist. They construct experimental posted-offer 
markets in which a monopolist faces either two or four buyers. They find that markets with 
two buyers achieve significantly lower prices, sometimes even below competitive levels, than 
those with four buyers. In particular they report M = −1.88 for the two-buyer treatment and M 
= 0.005 for the four-buyer treatment. With the help of additional control treatments they are 
able to isolate the source of the difference. They find that the lower prices in the two-buyer 
treatment is due to the monopolist pricing more cautiously when there are fewer buyers in 
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 Clearly, M = 1 (M = 0) means that the monopolist achieves monopoly (competitive) profits. 
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order to avoid costly losses in sales. Buyer concentration may thus be an effective source of 
countervailing power.  
 
Holt (1995, p.381) summarizes the results of monopoly experiments as follows: “Pricing in 
posted-offer monopolies is higher than in double auction monopolies. Posted-offer 
monopolists are generally able to hold prices well above competitive levels, but on average, 
profits are significantly below theoretical monopoly levels. Monopoly pricing in posted offer 
markets is facilitated by experience and by constant or decreasing costs. The effect of using 
simulated buyers, as compared with a small number of human buyers, is probably to facilitate 
monopoly pricing a little.” In the light of the results by Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2004), one 
would have to add that monopoly pricing is facilitated by markets with a higher number of 
human buyers.  
 
Given the clear deviations from profit maximization reported above, it is interesting to refer to 
the work by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986). In this study the authors collect data from 
telephone surveys to analyse ‘community standards of fairness for the setting of prices and 
wages.’ Summarizing the results of various administered questions these authors find “that 
many actions that are both profitable in the short run and not obviously dishonest are likely to 
be perceived as unfair exploitations of market power” (p.737) and that “even in the absence of 
government intervention, the actions of firms that wish to avoid a reputation for unfairness 
will depart in significant ways from the standard model of economic behaviour.” (p.738). The 
conclusion, hence, is that “considerations of fairness or concerns for long-run reputation, may 
act as a constraint on profit maximization”.   
 
Finally, we briefly mention that there is also a small experimental literature on durable-good 
monopolists that is fuelled by Coase’s (1972) seminal contribution. Coase argued that product 
durability can constrain a monopolist’s power as consumers might be willing to delay 
purchasing in the expectation that the monopolist will reduce its price in later periods. Later 
theoretical contributions have tried to isolate circumstances under which this is indeed the 
case. Experimental contributions to this discussion include Güth, Ockenfels and Ritzberger 
(1995), Rapoport, Erev, and Zwick (1995), Reynolds (2000), Cason and Sharma (2001), and 
Güth, Kröger and Normann (2004).39 We only mention some results of this literature. 
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 These studies analyse a wide range of features including one buyer vs. several buyers; one period vs. several 
periods; finite vs. infinite horizon; complete vs. incomplete information, same discount factor for the seller and 
buyer(s) vs. different discount factors for the seller and buyer(s). 
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Arguably, the most interesting result is that contrary to Coase’s conjecture sometimes 
durability fails to constrain monopoly power in that prices for a durable good are higher than 
for a nondurable good (Güth et al. 1995, Reynolds 2000). Second, often trading extends over 
more periods than predicted due to demand withholding (Cason and Sharma, 2001). Third, 
durable-goods experiments are rather complex such that without a sufficiently high number of 
repetitions, observed prices may fail to conform to comparative statics predictions (Güth et al. 
1995).  
 
3.2 Price discrimination 
 
The only paper analysing price discrimination by a monopolist we are aware of is the paper 
by Hudson and Lusk (2004) who report on “a Web-based experimental learning tool to assist 
instructors in conveying the central principles of [third-degree] price discrimination under 
asymmetric information.” Unfortunately, given its purpose, the sample size is quite small (13 
subjects). Furthermore, there is no comparison with a treatment in which price discrimination 
is banned and monopolists are forced to set uniform prices. Nevertheless, let us very briefly 
report on the results of this paper.  
 
In the experiment, subject monopolists are told that they are sellers of a higher quality and a 
lower quality good and that there is a population of ten simulated consumers, six of which 
prefer the lower and four of which prefer the higher quality product. So there is asymmetric 
information. Furthermore, subjects are told that production costs differ for the two products 
and that their objective is to price the two products in order to maximize profits. Surely, the 
optimal solution is to price the lower quality good at a price that extracts the maximum 
willingness to pay from the “lower” consumers and to price the higher quality product such 
that the “higher” consumer is left with some “information rent” such that all “lower” 
(“higher”) consumers purchase the lower (higher) quality good. 
 
Hudson and Lusk (2004) only present graphical results of their small sample of 13 subjects. In 
any case, subjects appear to learn very quickly to set prices that are very close to the optimal 
levels. It turns out, however, that convergence to the optimal price of the lower quality good is 
somewhat quicker and more complete than convergence to the optimal price of the higher 
quality product where observed prices are at times too low. 
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3.3 Price Discounts 
 
There seems to be only a handful of experimental papers that deal with price discounts—and 
most of them do not concentrate on abusive practices. For example Davis and Holt (1994, 
1998) deal with price discounts in posted-offer markets. The later paper is particularly 
interesting as it shows the effect and the interplay of conspiratorial discussions among sellers, 
secret price discounts and ex-post information about other sellers’ individual sales quantities. 
But both papers implement sellers of equal size and the second concentrates on collusion. In 
Davis
 
and Milner (2004) different rebate schemes that participants can choose from are 
exogenously implemented and the focus, again, is not an antitrust issue. 
 
A relevant contribution to the topic of price discounts granted by a dominant firm is the study 
by Normann et al. (2004). This paper studies whether or not—and if so, under what 
circumstances—large buyers (those who potentially purchase more than others) are granted 
price discounts. The authors draw on the theoretical literature that states that whether such 
discounts are observed depends, among others, on the curvature of the total surplus function 
over which the parties bargain. (Here, the total surplus function is equal to total benefits 
minus total costs as a function of the quantity sold to buyers who reach an agreement with the 
seller). Theory predicts that price discounts are granted to large buyers in case the total 
surplus function is concave; that no discounts are granted to large buyers in case the total 
surplus function is linear; and yields a variety of outcomes (including one with no discounts) 
in case the total surplus function is convex.  
 
Normann et al. (2004) test these predictions in markets in which large and small buyers 
bargain simultaneously with a single seller. Here, large buyers’ demand is twice as high as the 
demand of small buyers and different shapes of the total surplus function are achieved by 
varying the seller’s marginal cost function. The timing is such that first each buyer makes a 
bid that represents the price at which she is willing to buy units, with buyers not being 
allowed to bid different amounts for different units. The seller, which is not capacity-
constrained, observes each bid and then decides whether or not to accept it. Note that in this 
set-up there are no efficiency reasons that would suggest granting discounts. 
 
The experimental results strongly support the theory. As predicted, large-buyer discounts are 
observed only when the total surplus function is concave. The main deviation from theory is 
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that the absolute level of the bids sometimes differs from the theoretical predictions. Normann 
et al. (2004) do not offer specific policy implications of their results. However, it seems safe 
to say that their results support the view that under certain circumstances the ability of firms 
(even monopolists) to charge high prices depends on buyers’ bargaining power.  
 
3.4 Third degree price discrimination: zone pricing 
 
Deck and Wilson (2003) report results of an experiment regarding zone pricing. They 
concentrate on the gasoline market and refer to zone pricing as the practice of refiners setting 
different wholesale prices for retail gasoline stations that operate in different geographic areas 
or zones. They point out that this is an important public policy issue: refiners claim that they 
use zone pricing in order to be competitive with local rivals, while antitrust practitioners argue 
that zone pricing benefits the oil industry and harms consumers. Relevant for the current 
overview are the experiments on the competitive effects of zone pricing on consumers, retail 
stations, and refiners and the comparison with the proposed policy prescription of uniform 




In their experiments there are four refiners that each produce a specific brand of gasoline and 
four retailers that each operate two gas stations. More precisely, each retailer operates one 
station in the “clustered” area at the centre and another station in an “isolated”. Hence, the 
centre area is contested, while each refiner/retailer combination is dominant in one isolated 
area. Simulated final consumers are uniformly distributed on the grid with each consumer 
having inelastic unit demand. The experiments have a rich design and we will only describe 
the main features. In the baseline treatment, refiners have the ability to set geographically 
different wholesale prices, that is, each retailer observes two location-specific wholesale 
prices, but they cannot shift inventory between locations. In the uniform pricing treatment, the 
refiners must charge the same wholesale price to each station selling its brand, hence, each 
retailer observes only one wholesale price that applies to both of its locations. The experiment 
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 The authors also investigate the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon (the perception that retail gasoline prices 
rise faster than they fall in response to movements in the world price for oil) as well as the issue of structural 
separation, i.e. the legal restriction that refiners and retailers cannot be vertically integrated. Concerning the 
latter, the authors compare behaviour in the baseline treatment with a treatment in which refiners and their retail 
gasoline stations are vertically integrated. They find that vertical integration eliminates the double mark-up of 
prices such that all buyers, in clustered or isolated areas, pay significantly lower prices and have substantially 
higher utility when stations are company-owned. Thus, the conclusion is warranted that, in the laboratory, 




lasts for 600 periods (of 1.7 seconds each), with both refiners and retailers being allowed to 
adjust their prices at any time. Retailers and refiners observe all current retail prices, including 
those set by rival outlets, but only the refiner and the associated retailer know the current 
wholesale prices.  
 
Deck and Wilson report the following findings. First, under both zone and uniform pricing, 
retail transaction prices are statistically higher in the isolated areas than in the clustered area. 
Second and more important for this paper, when compared to zone pricing, uniform wholesale 
pricing increases retail transaction prices significantly in the clustered area, while it has no 
significant effect on transaction prices in the isolated areas. Uniform pricing actually reduces 
the welfare of those buyers residing closest to the clustered centre area and of those who are 
on the border of the centre and the isolated areas. Interestingly, Deck and Wilson find that 
refiners’ profits are unaffected by the uniform pricing: it is the retailers that extract surplus 
from the consumers. The following explanation is offered: “Under uniform pricing, the 
refiners offer a price that is above the centre area zone wholesale price and below the isolated 
area zone wholesale price. These refiners are balancing extracting economic rents from the 
isolated stations and remaining viable in the competitive, centre area. Thus, a refiner’s gains 
in the centre area, due to higher wholesale prices, are offset by reduced earnings in the 
isolated markets where wholesale prices have decreased and profits are unchanged. With 
uniform pricing, the retailers do not gain a profit margin in the centre area but do receive a 
larger margin in the isolated regions where retail prices are unchanged but wholesale prices 
have declined.” (p.23) 
 
To summarize, contrary to claims put forward by proponents of uniform pricing legislation, 
under uniform pricing consumers lose when compared to a zone-pricing regime. In this 
respect, the experiment confirms the general view of economists that one should not forbid 
price discrimination too soon.  
 
3.5 Entry deterrence 
 
3.5.1 Limit Pricing 
 
A firm engages in limit pricing if it sets its price and output so that there is not enough 
demand for another firm to profitably enter the market. Note that consumers benefit from 
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lower prices in the phase of limit pricing, but that this advantage might be offset by higher 
prices due to less competition if entry is successfully deterred. Also note that, in contrast to 
predatory pricing (that focuses on driving existing competitors out), limit pricing aims at 
preventing entry altogether. As far as we know, there are no actual cases involving complaints 
of limit pricing. 
 
Cooper et al. (1997a and 1997b) test a game based on the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model 
of limit pricing. In this two-period model, an incumbent is confronted with a potential entrant. 
The market is one with a homogeneous good and linear demand. The privately known cost of 
the incumbent is either high or low (with equal probability) and entry is only profitable if the 
incumbent’s costs are high. In the first period, only the incumbent is in the market. After 
having observed the price chosen by the incumbent, the potential entrant decides whether to 
enter or not. If he stays out, the incumbent remains a monopolist; otherwise the market 
becomes a Cournot duopoly. Due to the uncertainty about the incumbent’s cost (that can only 
be inferred indirectly by the entrant, if at all, through the incumbent’s first-period price), there 
is room for signalling through limit pricing in the first period.  
 
Cooper et al. consider two main treatments: one in which the entrant has “high”, and one in 
which it has “low” costs. The game with a low-cost entrant has a unique (pure strategy) 
separating equilibrium: the low-cost monopolist sets a first period price below its myopic 
monopoly price and so low that it cannot be matched by the high-cost monopolist, hence, 
there is limit pricing in order to deter entry. Consequently, in equilibrium, the entrant 
correctly infers the monopolist’s cost and enters if and only if the monopolist is weak. Note 
that entry occurs if and only if it is efficient. In the game with a high-cost entrant, the 
parameters are such that, given the prior distribution on cost, the entrant finds it optimal to 
stay out. Now multiple equilibria exist.  Along with pure-strategy separating equilibria, there 
are pooling equilibria in pure strategies in which the high-cost monopolist engages in limit 
pricing to deter entry. In these pooling equilibria, the high-cost monopolist charges the same 
price as the low-cost monopolist, nothing about cost can be learned from first-period prices, 
and the potential entrant decides to stay out. Note that in this case, production is not always 
efficient.  
 
The main finding of the Cooper et al. study is that “limit pricing reliably emerges in both 
types of games as the theory predicts with play consistently converging on a particular 
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equilibrium as a function of the underlying treatment conditions” (Cooper et al. 1997a, p.663). 
The patterns of convergence are particularly interesting. Cooper et al. report: “Convergence to 
equilibrium follows a characteristic history of play. Initially, independent of potential 
entrants’ costs, monopolists largely ignore any threats of entry. Given that entrants can then 
easily infer the monopolist’s type, entry rates on high-cost monopolists quickly rise, fostering 
attempts to pool with low-cost monopolists who are not being entered on. In games where 
pure-strategy pooling equilibria exist, play settles into an ‘efficient’ pooling equilibrium in 
which low-cost monopolists produce at their full-information output level and high-cost 
monopolists imitate them, forestalling entry. In games where no pure-strategy pooling 
equilibria exist, these ‘pooling’ efforts are shattered by increased entry that induces low-cost 
monopolists to separate to higher output levels” (p.663) In all, Cooper et al. show that the 
strategic use of limit pricing to deter entry does emerge in the laboratory. 
 
Müller et al. (2004) examine the strategic behaviour of incumbents and entrants in 
experiments that involve two incumbents and one potential entrant. The games are based on 
Bagwell and Ramey’s (1991) model of oligopoly limit pricing. Incumbents first learn about 
an industry parameter that determines whether their costs are low or high and they next 
simultaneously choose prices. Upon observing these two prices, an entrant who does not 
know the industry cost, tries to infer it, and next decides whether or not to enter. Higher costs 
are associated with lower profits implying that incumbents, presumably, wish to signal high 
costs. Consequently, one is tempted to expect that prices will be distorted upward when 
industry costs are low. However, Bagwell and Ramey isolate circumstances under which a 
“no-distortion” exists and incumbents play as if there was complete information or no entry 
threat at all. In this separating equilibrium, costs are revealed and entry takes places only if it 
is profitable (i.e. when costs are low). Thus, with at least two firms already in the market, in 
the no-distortion equilibrium, incumbents are unable to coordinate deception; hence, no limit 
pricing exists.  
 
Müller et al. (2004) run both full-information and private-information treatments. When the 
entrant’s outside option is low such that only separating equilibria exist, Müller et al. find 
evidence for the “no-distortion” equilibrium emphasized by Bagwell and Ramey. In 
particular, they find that behaviour in the full- and the private-information treatments is very 
similar and that incumbents’ first-period prices quickly converge to the levels predicted under 
no threat of entry. As the first-period prices signal industry costs quite reliably, entry thus 
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occurs only when costs are low. When the entrant’s outside option is high such that both 
separating and pooling equilibria exist, Müller et al. find that prices charged by high-cost 
incumbents in the private-information treatment are similar to those in the full-information 
treatment. However, in this case, under incomplete information, low-cost incumbents set 
higher prices than they would under full information. Consequently, entry rates are lower in 
the former case than in the latter.  
 
3.5.2 Investment into capacity 
 
Mason and Nowell (1998) consider a simple, complete information, two-stage quantity-
setting duopoly game based on Dixit (1979). There is one incumbent and one potential 
entrant. Upon observing the incumbent’s quantity, the entrant has to decide whether or not to 
enter the market. If it enters it pays a (commonly known) fixed cost, which is large enough to 
ensure that the subgame perfect equilibrium has the incumbent choosing the smallest output 
that makes it in the best interest for the entrant not to enter.  
 
Mason and Nowell run three treatments varying this entry cost. The experiments consist of 20 
periods with random matching and role switching. They find that attempted entry deterrence 
by incumbents is relatively common and that it becomes more common as time unfolds. Also, 
the frequency of deterrence attempts clearly rises with the level of fixed entry costs. However, 
a substantial fraction of the incumbents do not try to exploit their first-mover advantage: they 
chose quantities that are below the entry-deterring level. Regarding entrants’ behaviour, 
Mason and Nowell find that, conditional on the incumbent player deterring entry, about 75% 
of the entrants stay out whereas 25% enter nevertheless. It is noteworthy that both of these 
aspects are persistent even towards the end of the experiments. It seems that the softer 
behaviour of some of the incumbents might be explained by the fear of punishment which, 
given entrants’ behaviour, did indeed occur in the experiments. 
 
Brandts et al. (2004) report on a test of the entry-deterrence model by Bagwell and Ramey 
(1996). The starting point of the latter paper is the fact that models predicting incumbents 
installing entry-deterring excess capacity perform poorly in empirical studies. Bagwell and 
Ramey consider a three-stage duopoly game: First, the incumbent can (partially) pre-commit 
to a certain level of (costly) capacity. Upon observing this choice, the entrant can make a 
similar choice. In the third stage, the two firms simultaneously decide whether or not to 
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compete in the market by bearing (the rest of) the costs of capacity. This game has two 
subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies: one of the firms produces and becomes a 
monopolist while the other firm shuts down. However, a forward induction argument selects 
the entrant’s preferred equilibrium, implying that there is second-mover advantage. 
 
Contrary to this prediction, Brandts et al. (2004) find that the incumbent becomes the 
monopolist three times as often than the potential entrant (and that costly pre-installation is 
relatively rare for both the incumbent and the entrant). Moreover, over time play does not 
converge in the direction of the Bagwell-Ramey prediction. An explanation offered by 
Brandts et al. is that players might enter the game being equipped with a social norm that says 
that first movers have a greater entitlement.41 This pre-conception is apparently not eroded as 
time unfolds and players gain experience. 
 
Let us conclude this subsection by noting that Brandts et al. also run a simple Dixit-style 
control treatment. As in Mason and Nowell (1998), they find that the predicted first-mover 
advantage is strong even when the incumbent does not engage in entry deterring investment. 







The first paper investigating the possible emergence of predatory pricing in the laboratory is 
Isaac and Smith (1985). They implement a posted-offer duopoly market that is served by a 
large seller and a small one. The large seller has a cost advantage over the other seller, a 
higher capacity and a larger cash endowment. Sellers don't know demand, or each other's cost 
functions. After prices (but not the quantities) were made public, demand was simulated. In 
the experimental market, there is a predatory price range where the large seller provides 10 
units at a price that is (a) lower than the small seller's minimum average price; (b) lower than 
the large seller's marginal cost of his 10th unit, and (c) demand is exhausted. In this case, the 
small seller cannot earn positive profits, while the large seller does not suffer losses, although 
his profits at the predatory price-quantity combination are lower than at the competitive 
equilibrium. In these markets no predatory pricing is observed.  
                                               
41
 This explanation was put forward in Huck and Müller (2005) who report on the “money-burning” game.  
42
 See Gomez, Goeree, and Holt (2004) as well as Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt (2000) for other overviews 
on predatory pricing. 
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This “negative” result induced Isaac and Smith to make several design changes. In a first 
design change, sellers are required to purchase entry permits. But again, no predatory pricing 
is observed. As a second design change, sellers are given full information about each other's 
costs. Yet, again, no predatory pricing is observed. Thus, this first “search of predatory 
pricing” was unsuccessful. Isaac and Smith conclude: “We are unable to produce predatory 
pricing in a structural environment that, a priori, we thought was favourable to its emergence” 
(p. 342) 
 
Harrison (1988) continues the hunt for predatory pricing. He modifies the Isaac and Smith 
design by implementing five simultaneous posted-offer markets and introducing 11 sellers. 
Four sellers are told that they would become large sellers (with costs as introduced in the 
Isaac and Smith experiments) if they would choose to enter “their” market, but that they 
would become small sellers in case they entered any other market. The seven remaining 
sellers are small sellers no matter which market they chose to enter. Efficiency demands that 
each of the four large sellers enters his preferred market, each of which would also see entry 
of a small seller, and for the remaining three small sellers to enter the fifth market in which no 
seller would have a cost advantage. Note that the fifth market serves as an "active escape 
opportunity" for the small sellers. Again, demand (as in the Isaac and Smith experiments) is 
simulated in each market. Finally, at the beginning of each market period, firms choose a 
market to enter, a price and a corresponding maximum quantity. With this setup, Harrison 
reports cases of predatory pricing in the sense defined above. 
 
However, Goeree and Gomez (1998) replicate the Harrison study with the result that only 3 
out of 144 price decision of large buyers could possibly be classified as predatory. Note that 
in this design entry, price and quantity decisions are made simultaneously. This means that 
e.g. a large seller never knows whether he would be a monopolist in his market or whether he 
would share it with a small seller. 
 
Consequently, Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt (2000) vary Harrison's design in two respects: 
(a) Small sellers first choose their markets (which become commonly known) before all 
sellers choose prices and quantities (Large sellers can now react to entry and possibly raise 
prices after exit). (b) Large incumbent sellers have complete information about demand and 
other's costs whereas small sellers only know own costs. Presumably, this makes it more 
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likely that a large seller prices more aggressively. And in fact, Capra et al. (2000) report that 
predatory pricing consistently arose in most markets. 
 
Jung, Kagel and Levin (1994) report on tests of Selten's (1975) chain-store game and Kreps 
and Wilson's (1982) reputation model.
43
 In the model by Selten, there is an incumbent (a 
chain store) who is a monopolist in several (finitely many) markets where it is operating the 
same technology and producing the same products. In each market, it faces potential entry. 
More precisely, in the first market, first the entrant decides about entry. Then, if entry occurs, 
the incumbent decides whether to fight or to accommodate. The outcome of this interaction 
becomes publicly known before in the second market the same stage game is played between 
the incumbent and a new entrant, etc. In Selten’s model the incumbent is weak and prefers to 
share each market in which entry occurs. Applying backward induction, Selten shows that 
each entrant enters and is always accommodated. 
 
Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) model is similar to Selten’s, however, now entrants have 
incomplete information regarding the type of the incumbent: with some probability the 
incumbent is strong (low cost) and would always fight entry; with the complementary 
probability the incumbent is weak (high cost) and, as in Selten’s model, prefers to share each 
market. Kreps and Wilson derive a sequential equilibrium in which the weak incumbent fights 
entry in the first markets to make the entrants believe it is strong. Only towards the end of the 
game does it start to accommodate entry. The fact that weak incumbents fight entry in early 
periods of the game can be interpreted as predatory pricing. (In fact, Kreps and Wilson (1982) 
define predation exactly in this way.)  
 
Jung et al. (1994) implement markets in which a monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods 
against different entrants. They implement both a version of the Selten set-up, as well as a 
version of the Kreps and Wilson model. Using the Kreps and Wilson (1982) definition of 
predatory pricing, they report that, for experienced subjects, predatory pricing occurred in 
100% of the cases in the Kreps and Wilson model and in 85% of the games in the Selten 
model. Furthermore, entry rates during early periods of the game are reported to be near 0% 
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 Jung et al. (1994) is not the first and only paper reporting experimental results on reputation building. Camerer 
and Weigelt (1988), Neral and Ochs (1992) as well as Brandts and Figueras (2003) also report on reputation 
building in the lab. However, they cast the Kreps and Wilson model in a lender-borrower frame. The latter has 
some strategic consideration in common, but also important differences. For instance, whereas the lender-
borrower game can be given a “cooperative” interpretation, the Kreps and Wilson game has more of a 
“competitive” flavour.  We therefore, refrain from providing details of these experiments, as they seem not to be 
directly related to the kind of situations we consider in this paper.  
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in the Kreps and Wilson model and as low as 30% in the Selten model. In the Selten model, 
the experimental results thus differ markedly from what theory predicts. However, regarding 
the Kreps and Wilson model, also some deviations are reported. First, entry rates increase 
constantly towards the end of a game while the Kreps and Wilson model predicts fixed entry 
rates during these periods of mixed-strategy-play. Furthermore, entrants do not enter more 
often after periods in which no entry occurred than after periods in which entry and fighting 
occurred. 
 
3.7. Essential Facilities and Foreclosure 
 
Rey and Tirole (2003) define foreclosure as “a dominant firm’s denial of proper access to an 
essential good it produces, with the intent of extending monopoly power from that segment of 
the market (the bottleneck segment) to an adjacent segment (the potentially competitive 
segment).” These authors, however, also point out that a monopolist on an upstream market, 
faced with competition on the downstream market, may not be fully able to exploit its 
monopoly power as a result of the fact that it may not be able to make a credible commitment 
to downstream firms that it will restrict output. As a consequence, downstream firms will not 
accept contracts that allow the producer to extract full monopoly profits. Of course, vertical 
integration can resolve this commitment problem and enable the upstream monopolist to fully 
exploit its market power, but such integration may be blocked by the merger regulation. 
Martin et al. (2001) study this commitment problem of such an upstream monopolist in an 
experimental setting. The basic structure that they consider has a single upstream firm that 
produces an input at constant average and marginal costs and two downstream firms that 
convert each unit of input into a unit of a homogeneous final good. The upstream monopolist 
can simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it contract offers to each of the downstream firms 
specifying a quantity and a fixed payment it demands for the bundle. 
 
In a first treatment these contract offers become publicly known before downstream firms 
decide. Public contracts serve as a commitment device such that the upstream monopolist can 
earn the monopoly profit for itself by offering contracts that consist of offering half the 
monopoly output at half the monopoly profit to each downstream firm. If, however, the 
contracts negotiated privately, such that a downstream firm will not observe the contract the 
upstream monopolist offers to the other downstream firm, the upstream monopolist may no 
longer be able to obtain the monopoly profit. Predictions in this treatment depend on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs of a downstream firm concerning the contract that is being offered to its 
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rival. More precisely, if a downstream firm entertains passive beliefs, it thinks that its rival 
receives the equilibrium offer. In this case it can be shown that output is higher, and the 
upstream monopolists’ profits are lower than in the joint-profit-maximizing outcome.44 A 
third treatment implements the case where the upstream monopolist integrates vertically with 
one of the downstream firms. Here, the integrated firm can commit to sell the monopoly 
quantity through its downstream subsidiary and not supply the other downstream firm at all, 
hence, there is foreclosure.  
 
Martin et al. find partial support for the arguments from Rey and Tirole (2003) and the 
foreclosure theory. When contracts are secret (i.e. in the presence of a commitment problem), 
outputs are higher and the upstream monopolists’ profits are lower than in case contracts are 
public or in case of an integrated firm. However, the differences are not as pronounced as 
theoretically predicted. Moreover, the experimental results differ from the theoretical 
predictions with regard to the division of profits between upstream and downstream firms. 
Theory predicts that the upstream firm should have all the bargaining power (by making take-
it-leave-it offers) such that it should be able to extract all of the industry profits. This is 
observed most of the time in the treatment with an integrated firm. However, in the two non-
integrated treatments, with public respectively secret contracts, the upstream monopolist only 
obtains a fraction of industry profits. It seems that the threat of the downstream firms to reject 
the upstream firm’s offer limits the latter firm’s bargaining power.
45
 This unpredicted 
bargaining effect provides another rationale for vertical integration, different from the ones 
that are usually discussed in the literature. As Martin et al. conclude: “other vertical restraints 






When sections 2 and 3 above are put side by side, one cannot help noticing the discrepancy 
between the issues dealt with in each section. Whereas, for instance, it appears from the 
survey of the case-law that the application of Article 82 EC to rebate schemes or to access to 
                                               
44
 There is, however, another equilibrium (with symmetric beliefs) in which the outcome is the same as with 
public contracts. However, Rey and Tirole (2003) argue that the assumption of passive beliefs is theoretically 
more sound. 
45
 Martin et al. discuss (dis)similarities of their treatments with the ultimatum game for which experimental 
results reject the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction with its extremely asymmetric payoff consequences. 
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facilities has attracted a lot of attention, these themes do not seem to have been featured 
prominently in the experimental economic literature. Conversely, experimental economists 
have devoted considerable resources to investigating predation theories, whereas the case-law 
does not appear to indicate that this has been a significant issue in the application of EC 
competition law. 
 
One can speculate on a number of competing explanations for this discrepancy. We will look 
into two different hypotheses: the first one is that experimental economists would be out of 
phase with market developments, and the second one is the mirror hypothesis, namely that the 
sample of case-law studied in Section 2 is either not representative or biased in favour of 
certain types of issues. 
 
With respect to the first hypothesis, experimental economists appear to work mostly on 
testing theories or improving on other experiments. Most experimental studies are motivated 
either by a theoretical paper or by another experimental study. The research agenda in 
experimental economics does not seem to be driven by the occurrences in real-life situations, 
very few experimental studies are directly inspired by a real-world phenomenon or problem. 
Anecdotal evidence for this observation comes from a quick look at the program of the 2005 
International Meeting of the Economic Science Association (ESA), which is the professional 
organization of experimental economists. Only about 5-10% of the papers presented at that 
meeting are directly inspired by real-life problems. Clearly, there are many real world 
phenomena that, in principle, might be of interest to experimental economists, hence, given 
the already small overall percentage, one can only expect a very small number of papers to 
deal with antitrust issues, or with issues in industrial organization more generally. In the past, 
within industrial organization, experimental economists have been enthusiastic about doing 
experiments on auctions or other aspects of market design, in contrast to market regulation. 
The current preference might still be in that direction. For example, one of the few 
experimental papers on industrial organization issues presented at the ESA 2005 meeting, 
Porter et al. (2005), report on a commission from the State of Virginia to have experimental 
economists explore alternatives for the design of an auction that allocated bankable NOx 
allowances.  
 
With respect to the second hypothesis, the last decades of Article 82 EC enforcement do not 
appear to have been driven by any specific agenda on the part of the Commission. The only 
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exception is the use of Article 82 EC as part of the liberalization policy pursued in network 
industries such as telecommunications, post, energy or transport, which accounts for a fair 
number of cases. Leaving this aside, there is no evidence that the Commission systematically 
set out to identify the most pressing problems in the area of Article 82 EC and then to direct 
its enforcement activities at these problems. This might be changing now in the wake of the 
modernization brought about by Regulations 1/2003 and 139/2004, which highlighted the 
state of neglect in which Article 82 EC had fallen. In any event, a large number of the cases 
surveyed arose out of preliminary references to the ECJ, and these definitely do not follow 
any agenda. 
 
The case-law and the decision practice of the Commission could thus very well be affected 
mostly by the relatively haphazard flow of complaints to the Commission and preliminary 
references to the ECJ, so that the data derived from the table in Annex I would not have much 
aggregate significance as an indication of which problems are truly pressing and should be 
addressed by experimental economics. At the same time, it is conceivable that the complaints 
and preliminary references themselves are statistically indicative of which issues are most 
significant in the European economy, since they are made at the initiative of aggrieved 
parties. Yet not all complaints are taken up by the Commission and not all cases before 
national courts are sent to the ECJ by way of preliminary reference. Both the Commission (in 
deciding which complaint to pursue) and the national courts (in deciding whether to send a 
preliminary reference to the ECJ) have some measure of discretion. In the case of the 
Commission, it is a question of assessing whether dedicating resources to a complaint is in the 
Community interest.
46
 In the case of the national court, it must be seen whether a preliminary 
reference is useful to the solution of the case and whether the issue to be referred to the ECJ 
has not perhaps already been conclusively settled by the ECJ. 
 
It might thus be that the Commission and the ECJ are busy with cases that do not reflect the 
truly important issues surrounding the presence and use of market power in the European 
economy. For the Commission in particular, there might be a historical bias in favour of 
dealing with issues concerning relationships between competitors, such as rebates, refusals to 
deal, etc., arising out of the heritage of unfair competition laws and of the intellectual tradition 
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 Furthermore, in deciding which complaints to take up, the Commission 
might also be influenced by the lobbying efforts of complainants. That certain issues appear to 
be more of a concern for the Commission would then reflect more effective or persuasive 
arguments presented by the complainants on these issues, as opposed to an inherent 
significance of the issue. 
 
Let us now come back to some of the questions that we have posed at the beginning of this 
overview:  
 
1. Is there scope for further experiments within the sphere of abuse of dominance? 
 
As stated above, one of the things we were surprised about is the relatively limited number of 
experiments that deal with abuse of a dominant position in the strict sense. Perhaps, in 
retrospect, this is nothing to be surprised about: experimental economists have not let 
themselves be guided very much by Article 82 cases, they have their own research agenda and 
there is nothing wrong with that. Despite this, Section 2 of this paper has indicated some of 
the issues that antitrust practitioners worry about and we believe that some of these problems 
might interest experimental economists. In particular, experimental work on the following 
topics is limited, or completely missing, at the moment and additional work on these may 
attract the interest of practitioners:  
• Price discrimination (non-linear rebate schemes, loyality rebates, etc.)  
• Bundling and tying  
• Refusal to deal in a vertical relationship  
• Exclusion and exclusivity clauses  
• Predatory product differentiation 
 
2. Is the gap between experimental research results supplied by the literature and the 
demand of case handlers due to the inherent boundaries of experimental research as 
such? 
 
Our preliminary answer to this question is “No”, with some qualifications. It seems fair to say 
that competition authorities are using more and more economic reasoning when analysing 
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 See D.J. Gerber,  Law and Competitino in Twentieth Century Europe (Oxford: OUP, 1998) for an account of 
the history of competition law in Europe and its intellectual lineage.  
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cases and that, in particular, the application of theoretical models of strategic behaviour will 
become more widespread.
48
 It is, therefore, important to have a wealth of empirical evidence 
showing that the theoretical models the competition authorities rely on are indeed valid. Such 
evidence would help policy makers and courts to distinguish “normal” competitive behaviour 
from illegal practices. Surely, there is no shortage of theoretical models of strategic 
behaviour. What is missing, however, is empirical evidence. This is not surprising: in general 
it is hard to come by empirical evidence, especially since both theoretical models and business 
practices crucially depend on private information (for example about costs) that is 
inaccessible for outside observers.
49
 A unique advantage of experimental methods is that all 
parameters of a market are under control and, more importantly, observable. This is not only 
true for firms’ private information such as costs, but also for conspiratorial activities as in 
Davis and Holt (1998). Consequently, the value of experimental economics for antitrust 
practitioners may be indirect: by separating the theories that are empirically relevant from 
those that are not. 
 
Let us illustrate with an example. Huck et al. (2002) report on an experiment with bilateral 
mergers imposed in three- and four-firm Cournot oligopolies with constant unit costs. Theory 
predicts that these mergers are not profitable for the merged firms (see Salant et al., 1983). 
While theory predicts aggregate output well, it fails to predict individual quantities. Contrary 
to the prediction, post-merger markets are not symmetric, as merged firms produce a larger 
output compared to unmerged firms, and unmerged firms yield to the more aggressive 
behaviour of merged firms. As a result, in the markets with initially four firms the merger is 
profitable in the short run, and merged firms break even in the long run. This asymmetry of 
individual outputs has an interesting implication for the econometric merger analysis. Much 
of the econometric work on mergers using field data has involved structural estimation based 
on Nash equilibrium behaviour. In such studies, deviations from symmetric Cournot outcomes 
might be accounted for by differences in firms' marginal cost. In the absence of direct 
evidence on costs, field-data studies might well conclude that the merger resulted in 
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 The lack of empirical evidence and the problems of obtaining it are acknowledged by leading economists in 
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realistic: the models reveal that strategic behaviour can depend crucially on private information inaccessible to 
outside observers. Estimation of structural models is likely to be difficult, therefore, but it may be possible to 
predict correlations in the data. Experimental studies may be more effective;” (p.324) 
 39
efficiencies that reduced marginal cost and caused the merged firm to increase output. As the 
alleged efficiency increase is part of the welfare effect of the merger, conclusions about the 
desirability of the merger are misleading. In the laboratory, the experimenter can control for 
the underlying parameters, such as marginal cost, and a behavioural hypothesis such as Nash 
equilibrium behaviour can be accepted or rejected based on evidence. 
 
Experimental economics can contribute to observation-based underpinnings of strategic-
behaviour issues that can inform both theorists and antitrust practitioners. We think this is 
important as some economists argue that that there is some “judicial scepticism” against 
certain kinds of strategic behaviour such as predatory pricing that has led to dismiss charges 
of such behaviour in court cases until recently (see e.g. Bolton et al. 2000). But experimental 
economists have helped to isolate circumstances under which e.g. predatory pricing is likely 
to arise (see above). So, all evidence obtained from carefully and appropriately designed 
experiments should be welcome. 
 
Some caveats need to be mentioned. Clearly, there are many situations where experimental 
economics will not be helpful assessing antitrust issues. For example, it is not possible to 
decide in the laboratory the cost function that a firm under scrutiny has. In general, all aspects 
that define a particular market (like the number of firms, costs, demand, or the strategic 
variable (e.g. price, quantity or advertising outlets)) cannot be determined in the lab. One can 
only (and freely) specify these variables and experimentally investigate which effect 
particular realizations of these variables have on the (mis) behaviour of firms. 
 
Another qualification is in order with regard to the specific subject pool used in most 
experiments: college students. However, it is likely that recent attempts to extend the methods 
that experimenters usually use will prove successful in increasing the general relevance of 
experimental procedures obtained using convenient student samples. (See Harrison and List 
(2004) on the relationship of laboratory and field experiments.) 
 




In the wake of Tetra Laval,
50
 experimental economics appears more relevant than ever for the 
enforcement of competition law. In that case, the ECJ made it clear (for example in 
paragraphs 39 and 42) that the Commission must be careful in its analysis, and in particular 
that the economic analysis used by the Commission must be solid. While Tetra Laval dealt 
with merger control, there is no reason to believe that the ECJ would expect less from the 
Commission in Article 82 EC cases. Against that background, experimental economics can 
prove very useful in supporting (or weakening) theoretical claims. In the face of competing 
economic models, it can be conceived that experimental economics could be used to try to 
assess, in an objective and verifiable fashion, which of the competing theoretical claims made 
by various parties in a case is most solid. 
 
The ability of experimental economics to test theoretical models against real-world 
assumptions as to rationality and information, in particular, could greatly help to test 
theoretical claims. In the end, only the largest firms can be assumed to come close to the 
standard theoretical assumptions about rationality. Accordingly, in cases involving consumers 
(exploitative abuses) or smaller competitors (exclusionary abuses), experimental economics 
could make a worthy contribution.  
 
On a general level, there is an indirect link between experimental research and the work of 
competition practitioners. As also stated above, there is a strong link between theory and 
experimentation in the lab, hence, experimental research can help to assess the usefulness of a 
theory’s (behavioural) assumptions or proposed mechanisms. And to the extent that 
competition authorities rely on theoretical models of firm behaviour, experimental economics 
can help to assess a model’s validity. But we feel that much more work needs to be done here.  
 
In recent years we see that the work of experimental economists and psychologists in 
conjunction with theorists and competition lawyers helps to shape the behavioural approaches 
to industrial organization as well as to law and economics. (For the former see for instance the 
conference on “Behavioural Industrial Organization” organized by the Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin (WZB) or the talk “Behavioural Industrial Organization” delivered by Timothy Cason 
at the Annual Meeting of the Economic Science Organization in Montreal 2005. For the latter 
see for instance Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998).) These efforts are based on the insight that 
human economic actors are far less perfect than the ideal neoclassical agent and try to explore 
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the consequences of various limitations for the functioning of markets. Theses efforts will 
hopefully lead to a more realistic modelling of competition in markets. 
 
On a more specific level, the review of experimental studies for example in section “predatory 
pricing” nicely illustrates how continuous efforts of experimental economists help to isolate 
conditions under which such practices are (un) likely to occur. 
 
Vickers (2005) notes that the EU law on abuse of dominance is far from settled and that it 
could develop in either of two broad directions, with emphasis either on legal form or on 
economic effect. He sees advantages from an evolution in the latter direction but notes that 
these advantages will be realized only “if European competition law on abuse of dominance 
becomes more firmly anchored to economic principles, and where those principles are 
practically applicable by competition authorities, lawyers and the courts”. He furthermore 
notes that “to be effective, economics must contribute in a way that competition agencies, and 
ultimately the courts, find practicable in deciding cases.” In our view, experimental 
economics can definitely serve as a tool to make economics effective. In this respect, we note 
that Davis and Wilson (2002) also offer some thoughts as to how competition practitioners 
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ANNEX 1: Overview of the ECJ/CFI case law and the Commission decision practice 
under Article 82 EC 
 
The table on the following pages was established using the following methodology: 
- It includes Commission decisions published in the Official Journal (including recent 
decisions soon to be published). Unpublished decisions, informal pronouncements, 
etc., which might have been mentioned in press releases or in the Commission Annual 
Competition Reports, have been left aside. They are usually less significant. 
- It includes ECJ cases decided on a preliminary reference from national courts (Art. 
234 EC). Appeals to the CFI/ECJ from Commission decisions are dealt with under the 
corresponding Commission decision. 
- It includes only cases decided under Article 82 EC where the Commission or the court 
identified the abuse in question. There are other cases (essentially from the ECJ) 
where Article 82 EC was at stake, but where the abuse was not discussed. 
- Cases involving Article 82 EC in conjunction with Article 86 EC, although numerous 
(especially at the ECJ level) were left aside. These cases are not always entirely 
relevant, since they concern how State measures, in connection with public-sector 
firms or firms enjoying monopoly rights, can lead to abuses of dominant position. It 
can be argued that the specific context of these cases colours the discussion therein of 
what constitutes an abuse 
- For each case, the date of the decision is given, followed by an overview of the 
procedure and the type of abuse involved. There can be more than one per case. Note 
that in the Commission decisions, there was a finding of abuse for the types of 
practices indicated on the table for that case (sometimes reversed by the CFI/ECJ on 
appeal), whereas in its decisions on preliminary rulings, the ECJ sometimes indicated 
that it did not see any abuse with respect to the types of practices indicated on the table 
for that case. 
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Case-law and Commission decision practice under Art. 82 EC                           
 
Name Date (1) Procedure (2) Impugned practice Remarks 
          Pricing Rebates Discr. Refusal to Contractual practices Other     

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IMS/NDC 29-04-2004 *                      *                           
Microsoft 24-03-2004  *  P                   *     *                      
GCG/FS 27-08-2003  *                       *                         
Wanadoo 16-07-2003  *  P    *                                          
DT AG 21-05-2003  *  P      *                                        
Michelin II 31-05-2002  *  +          * *                                   
De Post 05-12-2001  *                          *                      
DP AG (X-border mail) 25-07-2001  *     *            *       *            *           
DP AG (parcel service) 20-03-2001  *      *     *                                     
NDC/IMS 03-07-2001  *  - -                 *                           
DSD 20-04-2001  *                               *                 
BA/Virgin 13-12-1999  *  +         *      *                               
Ilmailulaitos 10-02-1999  *                 *                            *   
BNP 21-01-1999 *                                   -              
Decca 21-12-1998  *                            *              *     
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Flat glass 07-12-1998  *  -     *                                *     *    
BPB 05-12-1998  *  -         *      *                               
London Europ. / Sabena 04-12-1998  *                       *                         
Bronner 26-11-1998 *                        *                         
TACA 16-09-1998  *                        *             *      *    
AAMS  17-06-1998  *                  *                     *         
Alpha Flight 11-06-1998  *  + +              *                              
Van den Bergh 11-03-1998  *  +                            *                  
FAG 14-01-1998  *                  *                              
GT Link 17-07-1997 *                  *                            *   
Tiercé Ladbroke (3) 12-06-1997  *  -                   *                           
Irish Sugar 14-05-1997  *           * *  *    *                              
La Crespelle 05-10-1994 *      *                                        *   
Almelo 27-05-1994 *                              *               *    
Corsica Ferries 17-05-1994 *                  *                            *   
HOV SVZ/MCN 29-03-1994  *  +                *                              
Sea Cont. / Stena 21-12-1993  *                       *                         
Cewal 23-12-1992  *  + -       *   *                              *    
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Warner Lambert/Gilette 10-11-1992  *                                      *          
FWA Ship Comm. 01-04-1992  *                                        *    *    
British Midland 26-02-1992  *                      *                          
Tetra Pak II 24-07-1991  *  + +  *   *         *      * * * *        *    *       
Soda ash - Solvay + ICI(4) 19-12-1990  *            *   *             *                   
Tournier / Lucazeau 13-07-1989 *                  *                        *       
Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen 11-04-1989 *      * * *                                         
Magill 21-12-1988  *  + +                 *                           
Volvo/Veng / Renault 05-10-1988 *                   *   *                         * 
Tetra Pak I 26-07-1988  *  +                              *                
Napier Brown 18-07-1988  *        *    *      *      * *                      
Bodson 04-05-1988 *      *                                           
Hilti 22-12-1987  *  + +       *          * *  * *                    * 
BBI 29-07-1987  *                        *                       
AKZO 14-12-1985  * +                                               
Brit Leyland 02-07-1984  * +                     *                          
BT 10-12-1982  * +    *             *     *                         
GVL 29-12-1981  * +                *                               
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Michelin I 07-10-1981  * +           *     *                               
Hoffmann - LaRoche 23-05-1978 *                                    *            
Hugin 08-12-1977  * -                       *                     * 
ABG 19-04-1977  * -           *                                    
EMI 15-06-1976 *                                    *            
Vitamins 09-06-1976  * +          *    *                                
United Brands 17-12-1975  * + (-)   *            *       *        *               
Gen Motors 19-12-1974  * -    *                                           
BRT/SABAM 27-03-1974 *                            * *                    
Sugar 02-01-1973  *                                         *       
Commercial Solvents 14-12-1972  * +                       *                       
Continental Can 09-12-1971  * -                                     *          
Deutsche Gramophon 08-06-1971 *                                    *            
GEMA 02-06-1971  *                                         *       
Sirena 18-02-1971 *      *                                           
Parke Davis 29-02-1968 *                                    *            
                                                     
TOTAL   17 50 12 14 6 8 4 2 2 1 7 6 1 2 2 10 8 1 7 3 5 8 5 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 3 2 1 4 1 5 4 3 
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Aggregates         Pricing:  17 Rebates:  18 Discr.: 19 Refusals: 23 Contractual practices:   22            
                                                     
+     8 10 4                                            
-       4 4 2                                                                         
Notes:                                           
(1) Date of ECJ judgment (for preliminary references) or Commission decision (for others).                         
(2) The last three columns indicate which Commission were brought before the ECJ (until 1988) or the CFI (as of 1989, with the possibility of further appeal to the ECJ)  
 P: case still pending; +: CFI/ECJ confirms Commission decision; -: CFI/ECJ annuls Commission decision             
(3) Decision of the CFI on a action for annulment against a Commission decision rejecting a complaint.                      
(4) Annulled by CFI (confirmed by ECJ) on procedural rounds, re-issued in 2000)                            
 
 
 
